Bottom-Fish Action Report for Week of August 16-29, 2009

Understanding Rare earth Mania

The rare earth sector enjoyed the strongest month yet in August since awakening in late April as media buzz about security of supply issues expanded into the mainstream. Even the New York Times has taken note through a September 1, 2009 article ("China Tightens Grip on Rare Minerals") which quotes prominent sector observers such as Jack Lifton and Dudley Kingsnorth but reveals a latent knowledge gap by placing Avalon's Thor Lake project in northwestern Australia. On August 18, 2009 Arafura Resources Ltd, now controlled 25% by a Chinese state owned mining company, broadcast far and wide news that China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology had published a draft report entitled "Rare Earths Industry Development Plan 2009-2015" which outlines plans to further tighten control of the supply of rare earth oxides and their downstream products. The draft report apparently includes a plan to ban outright the export of dysprosium, terbium and yttrium. These rare earth elements are classified as "heavy" and usually occur together in meaningful quantities in peralkaline intrusive complexes such as Thor Lake, Strange Lake, Bokan, and Kipawa, the flagship projects of Avalon, Quest, Ucore and Matamec, but not in carbonatite intrusive complexes such as Mountain Pass, Mt Weld, Bear Lodge, and Hoidas Lake, the flagship projects of Molycorp, Lynas, Rare Element and Great Western. My new KBFO Rare Earth Index reveals that the half dozen initial members enjoyed a bullish phase from early 2007 until the market crash in September 2008. The index came alive again in April 2009 and with the addition of six additional juniors with advanced rare earth projects has gained nearly 700%, significantly outperforming gold and the TSXV during this period. This remarkable gain is due in part to the very low stock prices of the recent additions, but since the significant movers were all either strong outright recommendations this year or at least mentioned as likely beneficiaries of the Rare Earth Mania I have been predicting since late 2007 when I upgraded Avalon from a bottom-fish buy to a Spec Value Hunter Buy, and devoted a lot of ink to during the last four months, I am hopeful that KBFO members have enjoyed the ride so far.

We have admittedly tracked a surprise "green shoots" rally in senior equities which in my view is based on a lot of wishful thinking about the speed with which the American consumer will bounce back, and as we head into the fall I am concerned that this senior stock dead cat bounce will start to sag and potentially drag down our small rare earth sector. Barring another catastrophic financial crisis, I do think gold will continue to hold its head up and at least contemplate an assault on the $1,000 milestone, which could shore up market interest in non-gold speculative resource juniors even while the senior equity rally fizzles. But I wish to make the case that the members of my Rare Earth Index are participating in a Rare Earth Mania that has barely begun, and that KBFO members who have accumulated positions think twice about taking a quick profit and heading for the hills, and those who have watched from the sidelines read the following material very carefully and get ready for a positioning opportunity this fall.

Some market observers have been dismissive of the rare earth juniors and even suggested that they make good short-selling candidates. Because Rare Earth Mania is still in its infancy there is a lot of volatility in this sector that can be exploited by nimble traders. But it would be foolish to put a serious rare earth short position in place, because these stocks are literally a tail wagged by a very big dog whose nature was made crystal clear in August through the Chinese draft report on China's plans for the rare earth sector. One could argue that the draft report is a trial balloon floated by China to gauge international reaction to a policy that can be interpreted as trade protectionism. Judging by the broadening of media coverage the report spawned one ought to be concerned that the Chinese will retreat from the plan and perhaps even pull off a "gotcha" on non-Chinese mine developers who have benefited from the rare earth media buzz. But I think the Chinese are serious, if only because the rare earth sector is still quite small in value terms, all things considered, and not worth working up western manufacturers and militaries into a tizzy. Most of the Chinese light rare earth production comes as a byproduct of the giant Baiyan Obo iron mine, while its heavy rare earth production comes from the south China ion adsorption clays. Baiyan Obo has huge reserves that could conceivably supply the world for centuries, but there are physical throughput constraints which would prevent Baiyan Obo from completely supplying annual demand during the next few decades, particularly if new technologies emerge and large scale commercialization of "cleantech" applications such as wind turbines and hybrid or electric vehicles occurs. With regard to the light rare earths such as lanthanum and neodymium China appears to be pursuing a policy of forcing manufacturers of goods that require these rare earths as inputs to base their component manufacturing facilities in China.

This indirect form of economic protectionism will not sit well with free market ideologues who prefer raw materials to be extracted and sold on global markets to the highest bidder. The famous quote from Deng Xiaoping that "rare earths will be for China what oil was for Saudi Arabia" is viewed as a warning when it gets repeated in articles about rare earth supply, but it is a somewhat incoherent statement by China's former leader. Oil is a bulky energy fuel that has to be transported to the location where the work is to be done and at current consumption rates represents an annual market worth $2 trillion at $75 per barrel oil. It is not conceivable that Saudi Arabia would insist that all its oil production has to be burned on Saudi soil, though in the long run when oil's role as a transportation fuel has shrunk to diesel and its primary use is as an input for the plastics industry, it will likely be the case that Saudi Arabia will restrict the export of crude oil in order to supply a domestic diesel refining and plastics industry. Rare earths, in contrast, are an incremental raw material input for manufactured goods whose annual demand has a value in the order of only $1-$2 billion. That is a puny amount and raises the question as to why such a fuss is growing in the media about the security of rare earth supply.

Rare earths have special properties which new technologies tap to bestow efficiencies and functionalities onto physical goods such as super magnets and energy efficient lights. They accomplish this in a way where there is no substitute outside the rare earth element group itself, and they do this by being a tiny physical input to the end product which also represents a fraction of the product's final cost. The suppliers of rare earths thus have pricing power in that they could quadruple the price without affecting the end-product's demand, which could conceivably boost the annual value of rare earth oxide production into the $5-$10 billion range. Because China currently supplies more than 90% of the world's rare earth production it has a near monopoly that should enable it to boost prices by restricting supply. But China has strategic and economic reasons not to pursue a cartel strategy. China is dealing with a new problem in the form of reduced export demand for consumer goods arising from the collapse of the global real estate bubble and the locking of the home ATM machine. Offsetting that drop is a transformational demand arising from the retail sector's desire for goods that are more efficient and have a smaller global impact, as well as from a state level desire for alternative energy based infrastructure. So while a new frugality pervades the consumer consciousness with regard to the consumption of "stuff" for which the advertising manufactured "need" has collided with the disappearance of debt financing and long term economic uncertainty, there is a willingness to make "infrastructure" related purchases which offer cost efficiency, durability, and to some degree an emotional dividend arising from making a choice that involves short term personal sacrifice in return for creating a generalized good. (Yes, even in America, where net takers are celebrated as winners and net givers are laughed at as losers while the zero summers eye both with suspicion, there is a subtle shift in the national psychological profile afoot.) Nowhere was this more apparent than in the American Cash for Clunkers program where consumers traded in their oil industry endorsed gas guzzling Detroit pigs for new cars with significantly higher fuel efficiency in the lower price category and hybrid cars with the cachet of a lighter overall footprint in the higher price category. "Infrastructure" spending from the personal to institutional scale will be the driving engine of the global economy for the next decade, and China knows it, because that is what it is pushing at its own domestic level. China thus looks at its near monopoly in rare earth supply as a way to achieve its economic goal of becoming a primary supplier to the rest of the world of manufactured "infrastructural" goods which derive their "cleantech" virtue from rare earth inputs.

China is also very keen to pursue its strategic goal of transforming its own economy into one with a smaller environmental footprint and lower energy import dependency. It is no secret that the 2008 Beijing Olympics shocked China into an intense awareness of how its production and energy consumption processes were polluting its environment, and that China is well aware that its access to raw materials from around the world depends on the approval of the eyes in the sky of the world's military hegemon, the United States, a nation whose overwhelming status as the world's biggest economy is on a relative diminution track that is bound to generate political crankiness down the road. During the past year China has adopted a new resolve to clean up its environmental act and develop energy infrastructure which does not depend on burning coal or gasoline. While there is some similarity between rare earths and uranium in that uranium's use as a fuel represents less than 5% of the cost of building and operating a nuclear power plant, they differ in that uranium's long term demand growth depends on the construction of new power plants. In contrast, rare earths have open-ended application and commercialization potential, especially given that the world is experiencing a new wave of funding for advanced materials research, and is struggling for alternative solutions to the dual problem of climate change and fossil fuel dependency. It is thus possible for annual demand to grow tenfold over the next 20 years, and that would strain China's own supply capacity, especially with regard to the heavy rare earth elements which are mined from low grade clay deposits that have an erosional origin. China's proposed ban on the export of dysprosium, terbium and yttrium has less to do with its economic manufacturing goal than it does with internal concern over the security of its own heavy rare earth supply.

The so-called "heavy rare earth elements" represent less than 5% of global production by weight, but may represent as much as 40% of the value of annual production. They are expensive both because they are rare and because their demand is inelastic. While the light rare earth neodymium is becoming well known as the magic ingredient that makes the magnet in a wind turbine or Prius hybrid "super", the addition of dysprosium to a neodymium based magnet enables the magnet to retain its magnetism under high temperature conditions such as you might find under the hood of a Prius. During the eighties when the United States was last concerned about rare earths the applications for many of the heavy rare earth elements were largely of a military nature and global demand was small. During the nineties Chinese production of both light and heavy rare earth oxides flooded the world with the result that existing operations such as Mountain Pass were shut down and lower grade deposits outside China on which companies like Unocal, Hecla and Iron Ore Company had conducted feasibility studies were shelved and in most cases either allowed to lapse or revert to their original private owners. Chinese light rare earth production was cheap because it benefited from being by-product production of the Baiyan Obo iron mine, and the heavy rare earth production, although involving very low grades, was cheap because the clay deposits did not require cracking of the complex mineralogies that characterize bedrock deposits of a magmatic and/or hydrothermal origin. Because of an apparent super-abundance relative to global demand China allowed inefficient and environmentally destructive production methods which recovered less than 50% of the ionic clay deposits' HREE content. The draft report's proposal to consolidate mining and processing operations reflects a sudden awakening to the reality that not only are these ionic clay deposits finite, but they are conceivably inadequate to serve long term global demand. By shutting down inefficient operations and banning the export of certain heavy rare earth elements, China would extend the life of its HREE resource and assure security of supply for its domestic needs. And if in doing so the car manufacturers have to source their super magnets from China based production facilities, so much the better for China's export economy.

The rare earth market is presently very small, and even if it grows five-fold, it will still be too small to justify policies guaranteed to annoy China's trading partners and raise the specter of protectionism. The "how could they" tone of rare earth media coverage, however, misses the mark. China's actions with regard to rare earth supply are completely defensible, and it is nonsense for media pundits to grumble about it. The rare earth media buzz is now largely focused on China's supply restriction plans and the potential impact that might have on the green economy, which makes this an issue of anticipation. The crunch, however, is probably still 4-6 years down the road, which also happens to be the time needed to bring an existing rare earth deposit into production. Unfortunately, the time for action is now or never, which is why I think the rare earth sector could go nuts during the next six months. There is a risk that the rare earth buzz will be a flash-in-the-pan that is only a vague memory a year from now, much as I suspect will be the case with the lithium buzz making the rounds. The lithium buzz is based on a mis-guided expectation that large scale commercialization of lithium-ion based plug-in hybrid and electric vehicles will start to happen in a year or two, and the delusion that there is a security of supply problem with lithium. A car sized lithium ion battery will not be ready for large scale commercialization for at least another five years, by which time Bolivia may have gotten its act together with regard to developing its very large lithium brine resources. Because of the ubiquity of gas stations and a reluctance among consumers to accept the range restrictions and recharging cycles for the first generation of electric vehicles, I expect an ordinary hybrid such as the Prius and its other Japanese competitors to dominate the car market during the next decade. The urgency to develop security of supply for rare earths, which are also necessary for electric vehicles and have applications unrelated to the viability of the lithium ion battery, is high and immediate. Car manufacturers need to know right now whether or not in five years they will have a non-Chinese supply of rare earths for their components, which is why companies such as Toyota and Mitsubishi are already developing relationships with junior companies that have rare earth projects.

China does not have a monopoly on rare earth deposits. All it has had is a production cost advantage which is disappearing as the need to expand supply to match growing global demand develops, and as China adopts policies which serve its own strategic and economic goals. There are significant rare earth deposits that include the heavy rare earth elements outside of China, and most of these happen to be owned by publicly traded resource juniors which either found them or acquired them when their development economics were hopelessly weak. Unlike the case with uranium deposits which occur in a variety of grades and sizes all over the world, rare earth deposits only occur in regions geologically conducive to the development of carbonatite or peralkaline intrusive complexes. The key idea here is that of a major system which allowed for the concentration of rare earth elements; rare earths are ubiquitous in the earth's crust at background levels or as localized showings in other geological complexes. If Rare Earth Mania takes off as I expect, within a year there will be more than a hundred juniors yapping about this or that rare earth showing, just as happened with UraMania in 2004-2008. Some of these early stage exploration efforts may pay off with a major new discovery (for example, Quest's Misery Lake project which I visited last week as part of my Strange Lake trip), but we probably will not know before 2011. The exploration timeline for a rare earth project is as bad as that of the diamond exploration cycle; don't expect a grassroots rare earth project to be a mine before 6-10 years from now even if Rare Earth Mania stays hot. Exploration waves during the sixties, seventies and eighties investigated most of the more obvious intrusive complexes, with the result that historical resource estimates exist for a couple dozen rare earth deposits in the world.

The next phase for the rare earth media buzz is the recognition that these deposits exist and need to be raced into production. Because rare earths are similar to industrial minerals which are sold through private supply channels there are no commodity markets for futures speculation as is the case with base and precious metals. There are thus no obvious ways to profit from all this rare earth media buzz, with the resulting risk that the media and its public will lose interest in this story. However, there is money to be made by investing in the dozen or so juniors which are in a position to bring an existing deposit into production over the next 4-6 years. During the next year I expect another dozen such serious projects to show up under the control of resource juniors. If we are to have a Rare Earth Mania of the sort that the Original Rare Earth Bug Jim Dines envisions, it will have to be because the market recognizes that these juniors hold the solution to a very serious problem, and the key to that solution is fast-track financing to develop these projects.

I have assembled ten Australian and Canadian listed juniors into a KBFO Rare Earth Index with January 2, 2004 as the starting date. Because of the limited number of advanced rare earth projects that could be acquired by juniors, I doubt the number of Rare Earth Index members will more than double over the next year. I have added companies to the index when it became clear that the company was making its advanced rare earth project its primary focus, even though it may have owned the deposit for several years. I have included Neo Materials in the index at the start because, although it has neither an advanced rare earth project nor had rare earth production, it has been the only Canadian company focused on the sourcing of rare earth oxides in China for downstream processing since the early nineties. Furthermore, the changing strategic and economic goals of China are forcing Neo Materials to seek control of rare earth supply outside of China, which means before long it will have an advanced rare earth project. Historically we have seen cases where a raw material producer wanders down the supply pipeline to become involved with the production of value-added downstream products. Very rarely have we seen a downstream manufacturer wander upstream to become a producer of the raw materials it needs for its downstream operations, largely because mining is best left to mining companies. But the rare earth space is unusual in that processing rare earth ore is the primary challenge facing any rare earth mine, first to crack the rare earth oxides out of the minerals in which they are embedded, then separate the individual oxides from the concentrate, and finally to refine the oxides into pure metals that can be incorporated into alloys and other products. The in-house skill set of a downstream processor is thus more relevant to a rare earth mining operation than ore extraction, which is an off-the-shelf skill set.

The development of rare earth deposits is the key to Rare Earth Mania, but the money making potential does not stop with the sum of the net present value of all the rare earth deposits that become mines. In fact, the net present value of all those deposits calculated as standalone raw material producers according to economic logic will likely in most cases be negative. That will not, however, stop Rare Earth Mania from assigning very high valuations to the rare earth juniors as they advance their projects. These high valuations will derive from a strategic premium associated with the downstream business opportunities that control of rare earth supply will deliver. While the size of the annual rare earth oxide market may grow fivefold to $10-$20 billion during the next 20 years, the size of the rare earth linked economy could grow much bigger. The big Japanese and European manufacturers are very much aware that their ability to participate in this business, much of it related to the "infrastructure transformation" that has just begun, hinges on non-political security of rare earth supply. Just as the Chinese government is now moving to lock up its control of domestic rare earth production in order to benefit its "downstream" national interests, so we will see end-users take steps to lock up control of rare earth production in "free market" jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada, the United States, Greenland and Scandinavia in order to benefit their own "downstream" corporate interests. Russia is not in the running because of foreign ownership restrictions and the apparent diversion of rare earth production from its Lovozero project to the military. India also has a history of government control. Central Asia, South America and Africa have countries with rare earth potential, but they have high geopolitical risks that include Chinese style control.

I think we are very close to seeing the media grasp that the solution to the rare earth security of supply problem is to put these deposits outside of China into production. Because every one of these projects faces serious challenges it is not just a matter of pumping capital into the juniors, which brings me to a very important point I wish to make. Since Rare Earth Mania started to stir in April I have been surprised at the extent to which the executives of rare earth juniors bash each other's projects. Some of the bashing reflects ignorance about the project, but frequently the "issues" are very real, and if I were looking at these projects from the perspective of ten years ago I would indeed have to publish a "thumbs down" on all of these projects. I do understand where all this animosity comes from, because these executives correctly perceive that the rare earth market is small, does not currently have room for more than one major non-Chinese supplier, and is vulnerable to short term price manipulation by China. Highlighting your competitor's flaws so as to discourage the market from bankrolling its race to production would thus be sound business strategy. But I would argue that today the circumstances are special in that the size of the market is poised to grow dramatically larger so that it could accommodate quite a few of the race to production contenders in my Rare Earth Index, but only if the end-user industry becomes convinced that we are dealing with a serious race to production with multiple finishers whose mines constitute the security of supply redundancy industry needs to justify long range commercialization plans which depend on the availability of rare earths.

All this trash-talking by rare earth executives only serves to highlight the challenges facing the development of a rare earth deposit in a negative manner that could undermine the optimism of the end-user industry that solutions to the supply problem will be in place within 4-6 years when it becomes critical. My advice to junior company rare earth executives and their shareholders is to stop the mutual bashing and acknowledge that the real enemy is capitulation to the Chinese monopoly on rare earth production. We are at a historical crossroads with multiple forking paths available to the course of history, not all of which serve the western economy or planet earth. Not only are you hurting your own company's prospects, but by undermining the perception that non-Chinese rare earth deposits can be brought into production, you are perhaps influencing a negative outcome. We are still very early in the Rare Earth Mania cycle, too soon for any of the contenders in the Rare Earth Index to stumble badly and get ejected from the race. Furthermore, I believe that as Rare Earth Mania evolves we will see a dynamic of sector consolidation emerge which will broaden the audience to include Wall Street, whose Goldman Sachs already has earlybird stakes in Lynas and Molycorp which are currently too small to merit this investment banking giant's attention, but, should Rare Earth Mania really catch on, would serve to qualify Goldman Sachs as hardly a "johnny-come-lately" when its analysts start to pump the rare earth sector. As the short term Rare Earth Index chart demonstrates, market interest in the rare earth juniors has stalled during the past week or so, which is to be expected. But if you look at my Rare Earth IPV Chart above you will notice that apart from Lynas Corp's Mt Weld project the valuations of the potential solutions to the rare earth security of supply problem are all still very cheap. I hope I have made a strong case to KBFO members that we are still at a very early stage of Rare Earth Mania, that we are at a critical juncture with regard to the escalation of market interest in the rare earth juniors, and that any softness during the next quarter as we tiptoe through the anniversary of the Crash of 2008 should be treated as a buying opportunity. There are also no bottom-fishing opportunities left in the rare earth sector; any future rare earth recommendations will have to be Spec Value Hunter picks unless we do have to endure another market washout during the final quarter of 2009.

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Bottom-Fish Recommendations made from August 16, 2009 to August 29, 2009

Company	Date		Price	Recommendation	Action	Net Cash	Net Stock	Gain	New Status
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Company		Volume	High	Low	Close	Chg	Status
Neo Material Technologies Inc (NEM-T)		10,853,600	$3.450	$2.800	$3.300	$0.310

Bottom-Fish Action Report for August 16, 2009 to August 29, 2009

Neo Material Technologies Inc (NEM-T: $3.28)
		Profile	Search	Web	Tree	Forum	SEDAR	Quote

Special Interest Comment - August 24, 2009: Neo Materials Expands Processing Expertise Through Acquisition

Neo Material Technologies Inc announced on August 24 a potentially significant agreement to acquire 100% of the issued and outstanding shares of privately held Recapture Metals Ltd, of Peterborough, Ontario. Recapture is a producer, recycler and refiner of high value minor metals and compounds, with current commercial lines including gallium and indium, with the commercialization of a rhenium recycling operation ongoing. The transaction, which calls for Neo to issue 4.5 million shares and pay $6.5 million in cash, with unspecificied options for additional payments in either cash or shares, at Neo's discretion, subject to operating results over the next three calender years, represents minor dilution to Neo's 114 million oustanding shares while the cash component requires only a small portion of Neo's $53.5 million of cash reported in its June 30 financials.

Several points of significance emerge from this transaction. Most apparent is that while Recapture is a relatively small target for Neo--Recapture's revenues for 2007 and 2008 were $22.5 million and $24.1 million, respectively--its focus on indium and gallium represent important diversification for Neo, a problem to which we referred in our July 31 comment on Neo and to which the company has stated its intention to address. Likewise, Recapture's research and production facilities in Canada, the United States, and Germany represent important geographical diversification for Asia-focused Neo. Perhaps more importantly for Neo's future evolution, Recapture's metallurgical strengths--Recapture was originally spun out of Lakefield Research in Canada in 1998 in an effort to commercialize portions of Lakefield's own research--provide a strong foundation for future growth of Neo's own work. This is particularly significant in light of Neo's recent efforts to expand outside of China that require it to secure new sources of supply, whether from recycling or potential production scenarios. Neo's April 2009 agreement with Minsur SA of Peru to investigate the potential of recovering rare earth elements from the Pitinga tin mine in Brazil's Amazonas state present one such example of Neo evaluating possible production scenarios. The fact that Neo's press release announcing the Recapture acquisition refers to "Recapture's strong hydrometallurgical skills in both primary production and recycling," even though Recapture's own website refers to the company primarily as a recycler of speciality metals where its limited production consists of extracting specialty metals from scrap material or toll milling, might be read as an indication that Neo views the acquisition as a strategic one that will provide it with additional metallurgical expertise that will serve it well in an effort to increase its role as a primary producer of rare earth deposits. Equally likely is that Recapture's current focus as a recycler of specialty metals will become the foundation of Neo's efforts to develop a supply of rare earth and specialty metals that comes not from mining but simply from recycling existing metals. This could occur by Neo expanding Recapture's existing recycling operations to include a wider range of scrap metals including those containing rare earths.

In our July 31 comment on Neo Materials we suggested "that the broader the downstream range of products that depend on rare earths, the less vulnerable will be the owner of an upstream supply of rare earths to predatory pricing unleashed by China," with the operating logic being that China's virtual monopoly on rare earth production, and particularly production of the range of heavy rare earth elements, represents a considerable challenge for any company attempting to establish production facilities outside of China. The announcement on August 17 that China's Ministry of Information Technology is considering possible restrictions on rare earth metals over the six years to 2015 only increases that potential threat, for while the announcement suggests prices for certain rare earths could increase significantly during this period, it also creates a setting where Chinese "adjustments" to export quotas could create enormous volatity in prices, making mine planning and economic evaluation for potential new mines extremely difficult. In this light, Neo's announcement of the acquisition of a company with diversified product lines in specialty metals such as indium, gallium, and rhenium may prove to be an important step in allowing Neo to protect itself from such risks by diversifying its own products and operations. If, as we have speculated, Neo does emerge as the consolidator of major rare earth deposits such as those owned by Rare Element, Avalon and Quest Uranium, this acquisition may turn out to have been a key step in bulking up the company's in-house expertise in order to make those transactions viable undertakings.--BD

New Bottom-Fish Highs

Company		Volume	High	Low	Close	Chg	Status
Anfield Nickel Corp (ANF-V)		114,900	$3.100	$2.300	$3.000	$0.580	BF LP Buy $0.30-$0.49
Intl Nickel Ventures Corp (INV-T)		906,800	$0.700	$0.400	$0.650	$0.275	BF MP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Linear Gold Corp (LRR-T)		2,466,100	$2.280	$1.640	$2.010	$0.210	BF TP Buy $0.50-$0.75
Max Resource Corp (MXR-V)		224,000	$0.280	$0.200	$0.215	($0.020)	BF XP Buy below $0.10
Quest Uranium Corp (QUC-V)		6,287,400	$1.550	$0.750	$1.290	$0.500	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Rare Element Resources Ltd (RES-V)		2,882,000	$3.370	$2.200	$3.160	$0.910	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Red Dragon Resources Corp (DRA-V)		617,400	$0.540	$0.350	$0.380	$0.030	BF XP Buy below $0.10
Soltoro Ltd (SOL-V)		774,800	$0.370	$0.300	$0.335	$0.005	BF XP Buy below $0.10
Western Lithium Canada Corp (WLC-V)		7,830,300	$1.330	$0.930	$1.140	($0.010)	BF MP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Western Uranium Corp (WUC-V)		10,181,500	$1.150	$0.830	$0.920	($0.060)	BF MP But $0.50-$0.75

Top 10 Bottom-Fish Volume Traders

Company		Volume	High	Low	Close	Chg	Status
Western Uranium Corp (WUC-V)		10,181,500	$1.150	$0.830	$0.920	($0.060)	BF MP But $0.50-$0.75
Western Lithium Canada Corp (WLC-V)		7,830,300	$1.330	$0.930	$1.140	($0.010)	BF MP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Quest Uranium Corp (QUC-V)		6,287,400	$1.550	$0.750	$1.290	$0.500	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Creston Moly Corp (CMS-V)		5,128,400	$0.300	$0.180	$0.265	$0.055	BF TP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Avalon Rare Metals Inc (AVL-T)		4,533,900	$2.700	$1.740	$2.370	$0.470	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Metallic Ventures Gold Inc (MVG-T)		3,410,900	$0.810	$0.590	$0.800	$0.190	BF MP Buy $0.30-$0.49
Commerce Resources Corp (CCE-V)		3,138,700	$0.450	$0.400	$0.435	($0.015)	BF MP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Rare Element Resources Ltd (RES-V)		2,882,000	$3.370	$2.200	$3.160	$0.910	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Nevsun Resources Ltd (NSU-T)		2,881,100	$2.090	$1.610	$1.930	$0.230	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
B2Gold Corp (BTO-T)		2,665,000	$0.720	$0.630	$0.710	$0.010	BF TP Buy $0.30-$0.49

Top 10 Bottom-Fish Value Traders

Company		Value	High	Low	Close	Chg	Status
Avalon Rare Metals Inc (AVL-T)		$10,045,473	$2.700	$1.740	$2.370	$0.470	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Western Uranium Corp (WUC-V)		$10,037,628	$1.150	$0.830	$0.920	($0.060)	BF MP But $0.50-$0.75
Western Lithium Canada Corp (WLC-V)		$9,005,806	$1.330	$0.930	$1.140	($0.010)	BF MP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Rare Element Resources Ltd (RES-V)		$8,422,836	$3.370	$2.200	$3.160	$0.910	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Quest Uranium Corp (QUC-V)		$7,864,526	$1.550	$0.750	$1.290	$0.500	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Nevsun Resources Ltd (NSU-T)		$5,252,368	$2.090	$1.610	$1.930	$0.230	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Linear Gold Corp (LRR-T)		$5,013,516	$2.280	$1.640	$2.010	$0.210	BF TP Buy $0.50-$0.75
Metallic Ventures Gold Inc (MVG-T)		$2,681,276	$0.810	$0.590	$0.800	$0.190	BF MP Buy $0.30-$0.49
Underworld Resources Inc (UW-V)		$2,278,426	$1.650	$1.300	$1.550	$0.180	BF Spec Cycle Hold 75%
Ur-Energy Inc (URE-T)		$2,057,012	$1.000	$0.880	$0.920	($0.090)	BF MP Buy $0.50-$0.75

Top 10 Bottom-Fish Price Gainers

Company		Volume	High	Low	Close	Chg	Status
Rare Element Resources Ltd (RES-V)		2,882,000	$3.370	$2.200	$3.160	$0.910	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Anfield Nickel Corp (ANF-V)		114,900	$3.100	$2.300	$3.000	$0.580	BF LP Buy $0.30-$0.49
Quest Uranium Corp (QUC-V)		6,287,400	$1.550	$0.750	$1.290	$0.500	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Avalon Rare Metals Inc (AVL-T)		4,533,900	$2.700	$1.740	$2.370	$0.470	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Intl Nickel Ventures Corp (INV-T)		906,800	$0.700	$0.400	$0.650	$0.275	BF MP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Nevsun Resources Ltd (NSU-T)		2,881,100	$2.090	$1.610	$1.930	$0.230	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Linear Gold Corp (LRR-T)		2,466,100	$2.280	$1.640	$2.010	$0.210	BF TP Buy $0.50-$0.75
Metallic Ventures Gold Inc (MVG-T)		3,410,900	$0.810	$0.590	$0.800	$0.190	BF MP Buy $0.30-$0.49
Underworld Resources Inc (UW-V)		1,561,900	$1.650	$1.300	$1.550	$0.180	BF Spec Cycle Hold 75%
Troon Ventures Ltd (TVN-V)		381,100	$0.840	$0.710	$0.780	$0.140	Spec Cycle Hold 100%

Top 10 Bottom-Fish Price Percentage Gainers

Company		Volume	High	Low	Close	Chg	Status
Intl Nickel Ventures Corp (INV-T)		906,800	$0.700	$0.400	$0.650	73%	BF MP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Quest Uranium Corp (QUC-V)		6,287,400	$1.550	$0.750	$1.290	63%	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Rare Element Resources Ltd (RES-V)		2,882,000	$3.370	$2.200	$3.160	40%	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Nevada Exploration Inc (NGE-V)		344,700	$0.110	$0.070	$0.080	33%	BF XP Buy below $0.10
Northern Superior Resources Inc (SUP-V)		84,400	$0.120	$0.085	$0.120	33%	BF XP Buy below $0.10
Metallic Ventures Gold Inc (MVG-T)		3,410,900	$0.810	$0.590	$0.800	31%	BF MP Buy $0.30-$0.49
Lexam Explorations Inc (LEX-V)		148,200	$0.600	$0.435	$0.590	31%	BF MP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Newport Exploration Ltd (NWX-V)		45,400	$0.135	$0.095	$0.135	29%	BF XP Buy below $0.10
Creston Moly Corp (CMS-V)		5,128,400	$0.300	$0.180	$0.265	26%	BF TP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Harvest Gold Corp (HVG-V)		330,100	$0.100	$0.075	$0.100	25%	BF XP Buy below $0.10

Top 10 Bottom-Fish Price Losers

Company		Volume	High	Low	Close	Chg	Status
Antares Minerals Inc (ANM-V)		123,200	$1.590	$1.250	$1.250	($0.350)	BF MP Buy $0.50-$0.75
Brett Resources Inc (BBR-V)		1,413,100	$0.970	$0.800	$0.850	($0.110)	BF TP Buy $0.50-$0.75
Mega Silver Inc (MSR-V)		478,400	$0.650	$0.450	$0.570	($0.100)	BF LP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Peregrine Diamonds Ltd (PGD-T)		533,100	$0.770	$0.640	$0.650	($0.100)	BF TP Buy $0.30-$0.49
James Bay Resources Ltd (JBR-V)		212,500	$0.360	$0.295	$0.305	($0.095)	BF LP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Ur-Energy Inc (URE-T)		2,209,400	$1.000	$0.880	$0.920	($0.090)	BF MP Buy $0.50-$0.75
Mountain Province Diamonds Inc (MPV-T)		131,400	$1.750	$1.510	$1.640	($0.070)	Spec Cycle Hold 100%
Olivut Resources Ltd (OLV-V)		124,200	$0.250	$0.180	$0.200	($0.070)	BF MP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Western Uranium Corp (WUC-V)		10,181,500	$1.150	$0.830	$0.920	($0.060)	BF MP But $0.50-$0.75
PC Gold Inc (PKL-T)		566,900	$0.770	$0.590	$0.670	($0.060)	BF MP Buy $0.20-$0.29

Top 10 Bottom-Fish Price Percentage Losers

Company		Volume	High	Low	Close	Chg	Status
Olivut Resources Ltd (OLV-V)		124,200	$0.250	$0.180	$0.200	-26%	BF MP Buy $0.10-$0.19
James Bay Resources Ltd (JBR-V)		212,500	$0.360	$0.295	$0.305	-24%	BF LP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Antares Minerals Inc (ANM-V)		123,200	$1.590	$1.250	$1.250	-22%	BF MP Buy $0.50-$0.75
Tarsis Resources Ltd (TCC-V)		8,000	$0.130	$0.130	$0.130	-19%	BF XP Buy below $0.10
Zazu Metals Corp (ZAZ-T)		368,800	$0.240	$0.180	$0.195	-19%	BF XP Buy below $0.10
African Aura Resources Ltd (AAZ-V)		269,700	$0.160	$0.135	$0.140	-15%	BF XP Buy below $0.10
Mega Silver Inc (MSR-V)		478,400	$0.650	$0.450	$0.570	-15%	BF LP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Lithic Resources Ltd (LTH-V)		113,000	$0.070	$0.060	$0.060	-14%	BF X Buy below $0.10
Volta Resources Inc (VTR-T)		871,500	$0.180	$0.150	$0.155	-14%	BF MP Buy $0.10-$0.19
Peregrine Diamonds Ltd (PGD-T)		533,100	$0.770	$0.640	$0.650	-13%	BF TP Buy $0.30-$0.49

New Bottom-Fish Lows

Company		Volume	High	Low	Close	Chg	Status
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